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Failed Solutions to the Energy Crises: Nuclear Power, 
Coal Conversion, and the Chemical Industry  
in West Germany since the 1960s 
Christian Marx ∗ 
Abstract: »Fehlgeschlagene Wege zur Bewältigung der Energiekrisen: Kernkraft, 
Kohleveredelung und Chemieindustrie in der Bundesrepublik seit den 1960er Jah-
ren«. By the end of the economic boom in the 1960s, the oil crisis caused an 
enormous rise in energy prices. Chemical companies, especially, faced a huge 
challenge due to their dependency on oil as an energy resource and raw mate-
rial. This paper explores the reaction of West German chemical corporations to 
the energy crises of the 1970s and their attempts to anticipate future energy 
crises. First, the companies tried to implement their own industrial nuclear 
power stations to cut costs and to become more independent from oil. Second, 
and with the help of the social-liberal government, they attempted to revive 
coal conversion technology. 
Keywords: Nuclear energy, coal refinement, coal conversion, chemical industry, 
energy crisis. 
1.  Introduction 
In January 1977, the German magazine Der Spiegel published the headline 
“Conflict over the energy gap – The great illusion of nuclear power,” referring 
to the latest critique of the heavily subsidized nuclear power stations (NPS). 
From the proponents’ point of view, as well as that of the majority of West 
Germans, there was no alternative to nuclear power as a substitute for coal and 
gas. At the time, politicians of different political parties supported this argu-
ment. For instance, Social Democratic Federal Minister of Research and Tech-
nology Hans Matthöfer (1974-78) claimed the lights would go out without 
nuclear power. His colleague, Federal Minister of Economics Hans Friderichs 
(1972-77), also saw no alternative to the expansion of nuclear energy. Critics 
denounced their argument, citing both the dangers of the new technology and 
the high costs of nuclear subsidies, which impeded the development of other 
energy technologies.1 One of the most prominent propagandists of nuclear 
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power was Heinrich Mandel, an executive board member of the Rheinisch-
Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerks AG (RWE), which cooperated closely with 
the chemical industry, the largest consumer of industrial electrical power in 
West Germany. With more than 500,000 employees, West Germany’s chemical 
industry sector contributed to ten percent of the manufacturing sector’s sales 
and was a pillar of the national economy. By the 1970s, this energy-intensive 
industry used about 12 percent of West Germany’s total petroleum consump-
tion, and its electricity intensity, which is a ratio of energy use to gross mone-
tary value, was considerably above that of the manufacturing sector.2 The chair-
man of BASF’s executive board, Carl Wurster (1952-65), and his successor, 
Bernhard Timm (1965-74), had been pursuing the idea of peaceful nuclear energy 
since the end of World War II. The chairman of Hoechst’s executive board, Karl 
Winnacker (1952-69), also made a case for its use, to remain competitive. Win-
nacker was also president of the German Atomic Forum (Deutsches Atomforum) 
from 1959 onwards; Mandel succeeded him in 1973.3 
By the end of the 1960s, the close relationship between the chemical industry 
and nuclear energy became especially apparent. Since the late 1950s, West 
German chemical companies had been following the international trend of 
using petrol chemistry. The rise of petroleum accompanied Europe’s economic 
boom in the 1950s and 1960s. By the end of the boom, the monetary system 
had collapsed, economic growth had slowed down, and international competi-
tion had intensified.4 Chemical companies had to react to these challenges, and 
cheap nuclear energy promised to be a key part of the solution. In 1969, BASF 
applied to construct its own NPS on its company grounds at Ludwigshafen, and 
Hoechst’s management also considered the nuclear solution. Both companies’ 
management called for the expansion of atomic power and to relegate oil and 
gas primarily to processing needs. Given the chemical industry’s energy needs 
and the rising energy costs, which began to climb in the mid-1960s, the com-
panies anticipated the approaching energy crisis even before the oil price shock 
in 1973, and they regarded nuclear power as a viable future technology. The 
first part of this article analyzes the companies’ strategies for solving the ener-
gy supply problem, beginning in the late 1960s. It answers why their attempt to 
produce their own nuclear power failed.5 
The 1973 oil price crisis aggravated chemical corporations’ resource acqui-
sition. In Germany, this event incited a second development in response, one 
that focused on the advancement of coal as a central energy source. Since West 
Germany’s chemical corporations already had knowledge of how to conduct 
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coal liquefaction and gasification, the industry was invested in the attempt to 
revive coal. After the crisis of the West German coal industry in 1957/58, in-
creasing oil prices offered the chance for recovery, and the Social Democratic 
government, which had a close relationship with mineworkers, availed them-
selves of the opportunity to support the mining sector. The second oil crisis in 
1979/80 reinforced the impression of resource dependency and gave rise to the 
continuation of coal-to-chemical plants. The second part of this article concen-
trates on the main actors in this arena – what relationship networks existed, 
how did industry and politics react to the energy crises, and why their techno-
logical strategies did not succeed?6 It highlights the bargaining positions of the 
different business and government actors and explains why these two ways out 
of the energy crises failed. 
2.  The Idea of Nuclear Energy in the West German 
Chemical Industry (1967-1976) 
By the end of the 1960s, West German chemical companies were heavily de-
pendent on petroleum and interested in using nuclear power and coal chemistry 
as substitutes for oil. At the same time, water and air pollution had become 
important topics in West Germany’s public discourse, and criticism of nuclear 
technology emerged.7 Thus, to construct an NPS, the companies had to over-
come safety-related technical barriers associated with the reactor pressure 
vessel and the risk of meltdown, as well as pass public criticism. 
In the 1950s, Hoechst had already started producing heavy hydrogen and 
had invested in nuclear fuel reproccessing. Unlike its competitor BASF, 
Hoechst regarded nuclear technology as a profitable business endeavor. How-
ever, compared to other business sectors, radiochemistry at Hoechst remained 
an operation of little importance until the end of the 1960s.8 Because of rising 
energy prices in the second half of the decade, interest in nuclear technology 
rose again, and Hoechst established an energy economy commission (Kommis-
sion Energiewirtschaft) to develop its energy strategy.9 In July of 1968, at a 
meeting with the two RWE directors, Helmut Meysenburg and Heinrich Man-
del, Winnacker stated that the decision for a new electrolysis plant would es-
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sentially be dependent on the price of electricity. He tried to put pressure on the 
energy provider to lower energy costs, but RWE was in a favorable position 
due to its dominant market position and Hoechst’s growing energy demand. So 
the conversation turned to the question of how to solve the company’s energy 
problem in the long term.10 
In 1969, more than 85 percent of the primary chemicals Hoechst used to 
produce organic goods were petroleum based. As a result, Hoechst was in favor 
of dissolving the compound structures of energy and resources and producing 
more electricity by NPS, thereby allowing the demand and price formation on 
the commodity markets to ease up and the price of oil and electrical power to 
fall. From Winnacker’s point of view, constructing their own NPS would be 
perfect, because the plants could supply Hoechst with low-priced electrical 
power and with enough steam to run their chemical production process.11 As 
such, Winnacker represented the typical attitude of West German industrialists 
– i.e., nuclear electricity could help overcome increasing power demand and 
future energy crises. In the meantime, Hoechst became aware of other NPS 
projects by energy suppliers and BASF. Winnacker was skeptical that these 
projects would be realized in the near future, but Meysenburg assured him that 
the large industrial projects would take first priority. In the case of Hoechst, the 
NPS would go into operation in 1974, and by 1980 a second reactor block 
would be completed. RWE would undertake the construction and management 
of the NPS and close a long-term contract with Hoechst for the delivery of 
electric power and process steam.12 At this point, the first differences between 
the chemical and the energy industry emerged. Hoechst wanted to contruct two 
reactor blocks immediately; otherwise, a boiler plant would have been needed 
to guarantee a steam reserve, should the existing block-unit break down. How-
ever, RWE threatened to withdraw from the whole project if Hoechst did not 
accept their terms.13 
Hoechst eventually decided that RWE’s offer was not attractive. The chemi-
cal corporation would have had to implement additional services, such as 
feedwater or steam supply lines, and RWE was willing to offer better energy 
prices only if there was an additional power demand. Since the two companies’ 
price targets were too different, Hoechst decided to give up the idea and instead 
use traditional delivery contracts to satisfy its power demand.14 Nevertheless, 
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the management was optimistic about the future of nuclear technology and, in 
the 1970s, invested more than seven million DM in research on reprocessing 
and uranium enrichment.15 This shows that, in principle, the management had no 
doubts about the technology, but economic considerations determined the deci-
sion. The idea of an industrial NPS was dropped before the review of a suitable 
location had even begun. In doing so, Hoechst avoided difficult applications and 
procedures for – and protests against – an NPS in Frankfurt’s exurban fringe. 
In the case of BASF, the Arab-Israeli Six Day War and Nigeria’s civil war in 
1967 intensified the management’s awareness of the vulnerability of the firm’s 
energy supply. At the same time, the company wanted to counter the energy 
sector’s rising development costs. After cooperation with RWE and Groß-
kraftwerk Mannheim to construct a joint NPS had failed, on May 7, 1969, 
BASF requested approval of an industrial NPS with double power of a 660-
megawatt plant from the Rhineland-Palatinate’s Ministry of Economy. The 
start of construction was planned for 1971. Willi Danz, a member of the BASF 
executive board, argued that this was the only way the company could stay 
competitive in global markets. In 1968, energy costs accounted for thirty per-
cent of production costs at the Ludwigshafen plants, or more than DM 400 
million. Although the investment costs for an NPS were higher compared to oil 
or coal-fired power plants, operating and energy costs were much lower since 
nuclear fuel was cheaper. The NPS would provide both electrical power for the 
BASF site and process steam for chemical reactions, similar to Hoechst’s NPS. 
It made sense for BASF to build an NPS on their premises, because steam 
could not be transported over long distances.16 
Approval of the NPS was required not only by the Rhineland-Palatinate 
Ministry of Economic Affairs under Hanns Neubauer (CDU), who supported 
the planning, but also by federal regulatory bodies. Consequently, the responsi-
bility of approval shifted to the Reactor Safety Commission (Reaktor-
Sicherheitskommission), an advisory board of the Federal Ministry of Research. 
In 1969, the Reactor Safety Commission created its own “safety philosophy” 
around nuclear technology in the Federal Republic and discussed the dangers 
of a suburban NPS. The Federal Ministry of Research advocated for a reactor 
outside urban areas. Its reluctance was based in the fact that BASF’s reactors 
near Ludwigshafen and Mannheim would have created a precedent of allowing 
an industrial NPS in close vicinity to two large cities. Furthermore, in the case 
of war, the Federal Ministry of Research’s position was to shut down all nucle-
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ar power stations. If nuclear power expanded, and West German energy pro-
duction changed fundamentally, this position would have had to be reconsid-
ered. Considering the Cold War, this was another argument against quick ap-
proval. The major chemical accidents at BASF in 1921 and 1948 also caused 
the mayor of Mannheim to express concern about locating the facility within a 
ten-kilometer radius of two large cities with half a million people.17 
Thus, concerns about nuclear power were raised not just during the famous 
protests at Whyl in 1975. While the societal majority supported nuclear energy, 
at the end of the 1960s, there were already successful petitions and protests 
against an NPS on the local level. In light of the increasingly critical public, 
Hans Leussink, head of the newly established Federal Ministry of Education 
and Science, postponed the decision for two years and, in August of 1970, 
initiated a DM-137-million, four-year research program. But the moratorium 
did not alter the German government’s fundamentally positive attitude about 
nuclear power; the conflict between energy security concerns and the risks of 
nuclear power came into the open. After confidential meetings between 
Leussink and BASF the Minister thought that he had acted in agreement with 
BASF. But, in fact, the company did not agree with his approach. Based on this 
misunderstanding, in November 1970 the Rhineland-Palatinate Minister Presi-
dent Helmut Kohl (CDU) made allegations against German Chancelor Willy 
Brandt (SPD) about the contradictory statements of the Ministry and BASF. 
Kohl also accused Leussink of unnecessarily unsettling the public about future 
nuclear technology with his public address. Brandt completely dismissed the 
allegations. On the one hand, this exemplifies typical disputes within a federal 
system; on the other hand, it demonstrates the power struggle between Brandt 
and Kohl for political leadership in West Germany. Leussink refused to grant 
BASF a license for the project in October of 1970, after the differences be-
tween the government and BASF had become obvious. However, he did not 
dismiss the atomic law, as Kohl had claimed.18 
A multi-year discussion about the dangers of a suburban NPS had now be-
gun; by 1972, a decision had yet to be reached. BASF answered a catalog of 
questions about additional safety devices, but the Reactor Safety Commission 
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did not come to a conclusion and demanded proof of the emergency cooling 
system and a functioning crash ring (Berstschutz). According to the Depart-
ment of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (Reaktorsicherheit und Strah-
lenschutz), a special agency within the Federal Ministry of Education and Sci-
ence, the request for experimental assurance of the crash ring was arbitrary. 
The department feared that if they granted permission to BASF, they could not 
deny similar applications for industrial suburban nuclear power stations. Fur-
thermore, until 1972, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had 
not approved an NPS in an urban area – and, until the early 1970s, West Ger-
many followed Amercian nuclear security policy.19 Two problems became 
priorities. First, clarification was needed on whether an NPS would ever be 
allowed in a metropolitan area; and second, additional security measures for an 
urban NPS had to be determined. After several expert committees saw no rea-
son to exclude the location at Ludwigshafen, the discussion shifted to coming 
up with “adequate” protection measures against accidents and external influ-
ences. 
The leadership of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, particularly, had con-
cerns. In the early 1970s, Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), a 
liberal, had discovered environmental policy as fodder for good publicity, and 
in 1973 he managed to incorporate the Department of Nuclear Safety and Radi-
ation Protection into his Ministry; thus, the responsibility for the BASF project 
moved under his purview. In the view of the Interior Secretary, Günter 
Hartkopf, the public was not ready to accept an NPS in a metropolitan area. 
Genscher and Hartkopf consciously stirred up public reservations about nuclear 
power. Hartkopf’s proposal to suspend all NPS construction projects until a 
final negotiation sparked a wave of indignation. Under these circumstances, the 
president of the Reactor Safety Commission, Dieter Smidt, predicted Germany 
would experience an energy gap; a response similar to that of many industrial 
managers who felt vindicated when the Organization of the Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC) limited production volumes in late 1973. Thus, the re-
sponsibility of energy policy had been passed on to another ministry, and the 
conditions of the energy supply fundamentally changed in 1973/74.20 
Although the Deutsch Mark’s appreciation partially compensated for the 
higher oil prices, chemical companies faced a great challenge, given their im-
mense energy needs. Therefore, BASF maintained its nuclear application, and 
in September of 1973 the social-liberal government’s energy program, which 
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provided for an expansion of nuclear energy, seemed to confirm the company’s 
action. Many West German industrialists wanted to expand nuclear energy to 
be prepared for potential future energy crises. BASF CEO Bernhard Timm took 
advantage of the media attention for the energy problem and launched a high-
profile public relations campaign in favor of the NPS. In the fall of 1974, 
BASF compiled the last outstanding documents and finalized an agreement on 
fissile material enrichment. The company believed it had answered every ques-
tion to the utmost satisfaction, and it expected permit approval by February 
1975. Yet, there was no consensus on residual risks. Although oil prices and 
raw material costs rose substantially in 1973 and 1974, and the German Coun-
cil of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat) forecasted supply problems for 
the chemical industry, the federal government did not change its position. The 
federal cabinet discussed different types of energy substitutions and savings, 
but existing security concerns and the growing importance of environmental 
issues – as exemplified by the second Environmental Forum in Bonn on De-
cember 4, 1974 – rendered its decision not in BASF’s favor.21 
In addition to economic and social arguments such as job security and reten-
tion, BASF also tried to employ the environmental dimension. It drew attention 
to the lower sulfur and carbon dioxide emissions of nuclear power as compared 
to existing power plants. But the Federal Ministry of the Interior was not con-
vinced. Instead, the new Interior Minister, Werner Maihofer, considered ending 
the application process in mid-1975, since the documents were incomplete.22 
The scientific and technical experts of the Reactor Safety Commission put 
technical safety standards first, whereas the Ministry of the Interior was con-
cerned about the growing public criticism.23 This negative attitude towards the 
project was obvious. So, in March of 1976, BASF Board members Matthias 
Seefeld and Berthold Frank presented an alternative site about five kilometers 
north of the original in a less populated region outside the factory complex. 
Maihofer welcomed the proposal; nevertheless, the Ministry demanded new 
analyses.24 Now, BASF checked the efficiency of the entire project. Construc-
tion costs had risen from around DM 450-500 million to 2.1 billion, due to the 
extensive security requirements. At the end of 1976, the company concluded 
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that the construction project was no longer profitable, even though the oil crisis 
had also caused the expected savings to climb – from DM 100 to 210 million 
per year.25 Consequently, a seven-year period of negotiations came to a fruit-
less end. While BASF did not reject nuclear power in general, it made more 
sense to cooperate with a power supply company for economic reasons. With 
regard to West Germany’s general energy production, Winnacker, Timm, and 
their colleagues correctly predicted that nuclear power would develop – nucle-
ar-generated electricity by power supply companies increased enormously in 
the 1970s and 1980s. However, corporate-owned industrial NPS never became 
a solution to the post-boom energy supply problems. Instead, the chemical 
industry relied on a market-based solution.26 The failure prevented the compa-
nies from using their own NPS to produce electricity and process steam, but it 
did not hinder the long-term success of the West German chemical sector. 
After the chemical industry overcame the structural and economic crises of the 
1970s, it prospered again in the 1980s. 
3.  Coal Conversion after the Boom (1967-1986) 
Oil was not only an important energy source, but it also served as the basis for 
many chemical products. Thus, in light of rising energy and raw material costs, 
entrepreneurs and politicians had to consider substitutions. In 1967, 79 percent 
of the raw materials used by Germany’s chemical industry were dependent on 
oil. Because of this dependence, Hoechst Board member Rolf Sammet believed 
West Germany should expand its coal refining capacity.27 The country pos-
sessed large coal deposits, and the chemical industry had a lot of knowledge 
about coal conversion, which it had acquired during the Nazi regime. The reac-
tivation of carbon chemistry encountered economic difficulties because of the 
mining. With the extension of carbon use, mining’s sales problems could be 
resolved and potential job losses could be prevented. In the second half of the 
1960s, the idea of coal conversion was widely supported, since industry and 
government expected it would bring greater national energy independence in 
times of growing economic interdependence. But the viability of the technolo-
gy had to be questioned. As Frederick Brüning, a board member of Scholven-
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Chemie, stated in April 1968, coal hydrogenation was indeed technically feasi-
ble, but it was not economical to operate without government aid.28 
Before 1945, companies relied on two processes in addition to coking: the 
hydrogenation of coal and coal gasification prior to synthesis. Since then and 
until the early 1970s, the fundamentals of chemical engineering had changed 
little. On July 2, 1969, the German Bundestag mandated a study to examine 
possibilities for a resumption of fuel production from West German coal. The 
results, which were presented in 1970/71, concluded that the price efficiency 
depended mainly on the price ratio of coal to gasoline. At the time, liquid fuel 
from West German coal was 3.5 to five times more expensive than petroleum 
gasoline. So only political considerations could justify obtaining liquid fuel 
from coal.29 A fast and cost-neutral transition was not in sight. But at the end of 
West Germany’s “economic miracle,” the country was not confronted with a 
great national debt, and many politicians still believed in the controllability of a 
complex national economic system. In March 1968, at a hearing on hydrogena-
tion at the Landtag of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), representatives of the 
coal industry calculated that DM 200 of subsidies per ton of fuel would be 
necessary to generate hydrogenated fuel from coal.30 At the same time, the 
Saarland state government examined coal recovery options. As mining compa-
nies in North Rhine-Westphalia, the Saarland mining company Saarbergwerke 
AG was affected by the energy market’s structural change, and in 1965 it 
launched the Saarlor Chemical Project with Houillères du Bassin de Lorraine, 
under which the Saarland Refinery was put into operation. The Saarbergwerke 
AG sought to promote the upgrading of coal to electricity, coke, and gas, and to 
move into the production line of the oil industry.31 Conversely, chemical com-
panies, such as BASF, integrated back into the commodity sector and acquired 
the oil producing company Wintershall AG, for example. During the Middle 
East crisis in 1967, Willi Danz of BASF re-examined the use of coal. Com-
bined with cheap nuclear power, coal hydrogenation seemed viable.32 Thus, 
with their ideas to revive coal and to use nuclear power, politicians and entre-
preneurs had anticipated the energy crises of the 1970s. 
With the rise of crude oil imports into West Germany, which began in 1958, 
1967’s Six Day War made the vulnerability of the West German energy supply 
                                                             
28  LAS, Staatskanzlei 1914, Ölhydrierung verhinderte Treibstoff-Kontingentierung (Energie-
wirtschaft 7 (15), 1968, 11.04.1968). 
29  Franck and Knop 1979, 131-86, 228-51; Schmalfeld 2008. 
30  LAS, Staatskanzlei 1914, Saarbergwerke AG, Reisebericht (06.04.1968). 
31  LAS, Staatskanzlei 1914, Chef der Staatskanzlei an Mitglieder des Ausschusses “Energie” 
(24.07.1968), ‘Chemie in der Saarberg-Gruppe’ von Otto W. Strüven (08.08.1968); LAK, 
714/440, Saarberg – Energie und technischer Fortschritt, p. 22-23; LAK, 714/7620, Werkzeit-
schrift des Saarberg-Konzerns ‘Saarberg – Zeitschrift des Saarberg-Konzerns’ 3/1967, Rohöl 
für die Saarberg-Gruppe, 15, Saarberg 11/1967, Saarland-Raffinerie produziert und liefert, 10. 
32  Abelshauser 2002, 454-6; Schröter 1996, 109-38, 129. 
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obvious. The anticipation of future energy crises set up discussion about con-
version before the oil price shock. In this regard, in 1969 the Federal Ministry 
of Education and Science had approved a request from Mining Research 
(Bergbau-Forschung GmbH) to generate coal-based electricity through magne-
tohydrodynamic energy conversion. The research institution estimated an in-
vestment of DM 2.2 million was needed, of which the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Science took over 75 percent. However, the Ministry was still 
skeptical of coal gasification by nuclear reactor heat, and it questioned its prof-
itability.33 Despite this, coal gasification using nuclear process heat remained a 
theme throughout the 1970s.34 
The first oil crisis of 1973/74 provided a new impetus to coal gasification 
and liquefaction. In this sense, the oil crisis was more of a catalyst than a cause. 
In the short term, chemical companies, such as BASF, once again had to rely 
on coal from their mines and on other petroleum fractions; but in the long term, 
the procurement of raw materials, the energy supply, and the production pro-
gram had to be rebalanced. Therefore, in the midterm, the BASF board directed 
the development of an energy savings program and refocussing on specialty 
products.35 At the Hoechst sites in the Rhine-Main area, about 30 percent of the 
energy needs normally covered by oil were met by coal and natural gas instead 
during the highest point of the crisis.36 In May 1973, the Federal Ministry for 
Research and Technology (FMRT) initiated an analysis of energy-saving tech-
nologies. The experts were to formulate concrete results within two years; but 
when the oil crisis necessitated a revision of existing energy demand forecasts, 
the deadline was moved to 1977/78. The 4,000-page study concluded that the 
chemical industry’s energy consumption for the production of basic organic 
substances could be reduced 30 to 40 percent by increasing efficiency, in-
stalling energy recovery systems, and implementing new technologies.37 Like-
wise, in September 1973 the social-liberal coalition’s energy program called 
for an expansion of nuclear energy as part of energy diversification and at-
tached major importance to coal as a safety cushion, particularly for the elec-
tricity supply. Despite cost disadvantages as compared to oil, this program was 
                                                             
33  Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum (montan.dok) beim Deutschen Bergbau-
Museum Bochum (BBA), 122/281, Forschungsvorhaben (28.10.1968), Bericht von Reerink 
und Peters über Forschungsvorhaben; montan.dok BBA, 122/282, Aktenvermerk betr. Be-
sprechung mit BMBW (25.11.1968). 
34  Franck and Knop 1979, 178-182; montan.dok BBA, 122/15, Aktenvermerk D. Wiegand betr. 
Programmstudie ‘Sekundärenergiesystem’ (04.07.1975); Schröter 2000, 394-5. 
35  Schröter 1996, 128-30. 
36  WAUK, Business Report Hoechst 1974, 31-3. 
37  Montan.dok BBA, 122/15, Aktennotiz von Hagemann (08.01.1974), Bericht für BMFT-
Kurzstudie ‘Entwicklung der Energiepreise’ (09.01.1975); montan.dok BBA, Notiz betr. Be-
sprechung der geplanten ‘Studie über Technologien zur Einsparung von Energie’ 
(30.05.1973); montan.dok BBA, Kurzzusammenfassung von Ergebnissen der Studie ‘Techno-
logien zur Einsparung von Energie’ (July 1976). 
HSR 39 (2014) 4  │  262 
implemented to assuage the uncertainty of the world energy markets and re-
duce the dependence on imported energy. Energy policy reasons, as well as 
social and regional policy considerations (with regard to North Rhine-
Westphalia and Saarland), compelled the federal government to take this view. 
Only one year later, the government increased investment in the coal sector 
from DM 160 to 210 million.38 This increase was accompanied by a large num-
ber of projects in which chemical and mining companies operated on coal con-
version with government research support. Although the vertical integration of 
chemical and mining companies could have resulted in conflict, state support 
offered the opportunity of a win-win situation. Chemical companies wanted to 
cut their raw material and energy costs and develop new businesses, whereas the 
mining industry tried to restore a profitable production. Many politicians predict-
ed coal would provide a golden future, and many mining companies hoped for 
the black diamond’s renaissance.39 
The rise of oil prices brought options for substitutions back into discussion, 
and in 1974 the government announced further projects to develop advanced 
coal conversion processes.40 The 1974-1977 Energy Research Program (Rah-
menprogramm Energieforschung) assumed that natural gas and oil reserves 
would dry up in the coming decades. Hence, coal and nuclear energy should be 
able to meet future energy needs. Priority was placed on the development of 
coal liquefaction processes, coal pressure gasification, coal gasification with 
nuclear power heat, and the production of raw materials for the chemical indus-
try.41 Concerned with high energy prices and market uncertainties, the chemical 
industry established a coal conversion working group within the German 
Chemical Industry Association, which became an advisory board of the Federal 
Ministry for Research and Technology in 1976.42 On October 25, 1972, Saar-
land had already presented an energy policy concept, which was integrated into 
an energy program in 1974. The Saarbergwerke AG was well prepared for this 
challenge and explored coal hydrogenation; their results would enable the 
construction of a pilot plant starting in 1977. At the same time, the Saar-
bergwerke AG received 75 percent of the funding for a DM-40-million pres-
                                                             
38  Bundestagsdrucksache 7/1057, 7. Wahlperiode, Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, 
Die Energiepolitik der Bundesregierung (03.10.1973); Bundestagsdrucksache 7/2713, 7. 
Wahlperiode, Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, Erste Fortschreibung des Energie-
programms der Bundesregierung (30.10.1974). 
39  Montan.dok BBA, 122/159, Aktenvermerk über das 6. Gespräch zwischen Wissenschaft und 
Wirtschaft (22.11.1973), Hans-Dieter Schilling: Die technischen Möglichkeiten sind vorhan-
den, Peters: Interview ‘Comeback’ der Steinkohle? Umschau 74 (1), 1974, 3. The idea to ex-
tend the uses of coal was also common in the U.S., Great Britain, Japan and the Nether-
lands. See montan.dok BBA, 122/183, Aktenvermerk Schilling betr. Energy Coordinating 
Group (15.05.1974). 
40  Montan.dok BBA, 122/163, BMFT-Mitteilungen 2, 1980, 26.02.1980. 
41  LAS, Z75, Saarberg VI/1974, Kohleforschung wird vorangetrieben, 9-10. 
42  Schröter 2000, 388-90. 
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sure gasification project, which began in 1975, and cooperated with BASF on 
coal conversion.43 Some years later, Federal Research Minister Volker Hauff 
(1978-80) put the coal gasification demonstration plant in Völklingen-
Fürstenhausen into operation, which then produced synthesis gas for the chem-
ical industry. It was the world’s largest facility of its kind, demonstrating the 
strong will of chemical companies, the mining industry, and politicians to 
implement a new energy mix for West Germany.44 
Chemical companies with a primary interest in the production of basic 
chemicals were involved in such research and cooperated with mining compa-
nies. This inter-sectoral cooperation was typical for the West German produc-
tion regime. From 1975 onwards, the research program of Ruhrchemie AG, a 
subsidiary of Hoechst, targeted the recovery and substitution of resources. 
Ruhrchemie cooperated with Ruhrkohle AG and established a large scale, 
pulverized-coal pressure gasification operation, which was funded by the Fed-
eral Ministry for Research and Technology, to substitute heavy fuel oil with 
coal.45 The costs of the plant, built in Oberhausen-Holten in 1977, amounted to 
DM 30 million, of which 60 percent was funded by the state. Minister Hauff 
considered a viable West German coal industry as insurance against oil price 
increases and future energy crises.46 Although oil prices rose again in the sec-
ond crisis and, in 1980, Ruhrchemie considered its coal gasification process 
well-engineered, the company still requested further government support. By 
the spring of 1980, it was able to produce organic chemicals from synthetic gas 
and sell licenses for using new methods to U.S. companies. Hence, the devel-
opment and export of process technology also became economically important. 
New methods and machines offered promising business opportunities to the 
export-oriented German economy.47 
                                                             
43  LAS, Z75, Saarberg 1974, Kohle zunehmend gefragt, II/74,7, Überwindung der Energiekrise, 
III/74, 11-23, Energieprogramm für das Saarland, VIII/74, 15; LAS, Z75, Saarberg 1975, Öl 
aus Steinkohle, VIII/75, 11; LAS, Z75, Saarberg 1976, Forschungsministerium unterstützt 
Saarberg-Hydrierung, III/76, 7; LAS, Z75, Saarberg 1977, Technologiezentrum Saar für Koh-
le-Druckvergasung, III/77, 11; LAS, Z75, Saarberg 1979, Autos fuhren mit Saarkohle-Benzin, 
VI/79, 3. 
44  LAS, Z75, Saarberg 1980, Neue Demonstrationsanlage zur Kohledruckvergasung im Saar-
land, III/80, 5-6; LAS, Z75, Saarberg 1981, Gesellschaft für Kohleverflüssigung gegründet, 
V/81, 11; LAS, Bestand Saarberg Saarbergwerke AG, no. 81, Saarberg: Kohleverflüssigung – 
Coal Liquefaction, no. 84, Saarberg – Neue Entwicklungen: Kohleverflüssigung, 12-8. 
45  Schröter 2000, 391-2; WWA, Dortmund, 7, Business Reports no. 418, Ruhrchemie 1975, 8, 
Ruhrchemie 1976, 9, Ruhrchemie 1978, 8, Ruhrchemie 1979, 8; WAUK, Business Report 
Ruhrkohle AG 1974, 8. 
46  WWA, Dortmund, 32, no. 226, Aus Steinkohle soll Synthesegas werden, 1977, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, March 31; Bei Ruhrchemie wird Gas aus Kohle gemacht, 1978, WAZ, April 4; Kohlegas 
auch für Chemieprodukte, 1980, Blick durch die Wirtschaft, February 23; WWA, Dortmund, F 
1968, 361/78, Ruhrchemie AG, ed., 1978, Ruhrchemie 1927-1977, 80-2, Düsseldorf: Econ. 
47  WWA, Dortmund, 7, Business Reports no. 418, Ruhrchemie 1979, 8, Ruhrchemie 1980, 8, 
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The second oil price shock underlined the political vulnerability of oil supplies 
and triggered a second phase of acceleration in energy policy. The German 
government again prioritized its domestic coal. In 1980, the federal government 
passed a coal conversion program, which included a total of 14 coal gasifica-
tion and liquefaction projects. By 1993, it would invest a total of DM 13 bil-
lion. Export opportunities for West German coal conversion technologies par-
ticularly increased. Minister Hauff explained that coal conversion could 
become the most important cornerstone of long-term energy and raw material 
supply, and he called West Germany one of the leading nations in this field 
thanks to state-sponsored pilot projects in the 1970s. Between 1974 and 1980, 
the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology had invested DM 650 mil-
lion in new coal conversion technologies. This included seven pilot coal gasifi-
cation plants, which went into operation between 1977 and 1980, as well as the 
two coal liquefaction plants of Saarbergwerke AG and Ruhrkohle AG/Veba Oil 
AG. Between 1974 and 1984, the federal government and the state of North 
Rhine-Westphalia subsidized energy research costs with a total of DM 1.6 
billion. Basic research was funded with government aid. The first large-scale 
coal gasification and coal liquefaction plants would come into operation in 
1985/86, and, according to Hauff, they necessitated the expansion of nuclear 
power and the increase of domestic coal production.48 
Hoechst participated in the government-sponsored coal conversion program 
through both its subsidiary Ruhrchemie and its plant engineering subsidiary 
Uhde GmbH. Since 1953, Uhde had held the right to implement the Texaco 
coal gasification process, and it cooperated closely with Ruhrchemie and 
Ruhrkohle – the two companies tested this method in the pilot plant at Ober-
hausen-Holten, where Uhde acted as the general contractor.49 The synthesis gas 
plant, called Synthesegas-Anlage Ruhr GmbH (SAR), costed DM 220 million 
and began operations in August of 1986. The Federal Ministry for Research 
and Technology and North Rhine-Westphalia promoted the plant’s develop-
ment, providing DM 66 million between 1978 and 1982; the Federal Ministry 
of Economics contributed another DM 101 million for the construction of the 
commercial plant. From the early 1970s, Uhde also worked closely with 
                                                             
48  Montan.dok BBA, 122/163, Hans-Dieter Schilling and U. Krauß, 1981, Kohlenveredelung und 
Kohlenverwendung, Brennstoff-Wärme-Kraft 33 (4): 130-4; BMFT-Mitteilungen 2/1980, 
26.02.1980; LAK, 714/7626, Saarberg 2/1984, Neues Konzept zur Kohlehydrierung, S.16; 
LAK, 860/11027, BMFT/BMWi: Stand und Aussichten neuer Kohleveredelungstechnologien 
(05.06.1979), BMWi/BMFT: Kurzfassung zum Kohleveredelungsprogramm der Bundesregie-
rung (28.01.1980), Kohleveredelung. Ungeahnte Risiken, 1980, Wirtschaftswoche, January 1; 
Vorrang für Kohle heißt Vorrang für Kernenergie, 1980, Frankfurter Rundschau, February 5; 
Ministerpräsidenten-Besprechung (25.02.1980), Kohleveredelung. Ohne falsche Euphorie, 
1980, Wirtschaftswoche, March 7; Schröter 2000, 390-1. From 1970 to 1995 the German 
government provided coal research by Euro 2.2 billion. Cf. Schmalfeld 2008, 1. 
49  The Texaco coal gasification process proved itself capable of gasifying pulverized coal at 
high temperatures and pressures. 
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Rheinische Braunkohlenwerke AG, and in 1983 engineers built a large-scale 
gasification plant using the High Temperature Winkler process. Even abroad, 
Uhde was engaged in coal conversion and, in the early 1980s, took on the plan-
ning for a Swedish energy complex. The new government under Helmut Kohl 
followed its predecessor and promoted research and development in coal con-
version. Federal Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber (1982-93) and Federal 
Economic Minister Martin Bangemann (1984-88) glorified the future potential 
of the new technology at the inauguration of the two plants in Oberhausen and 
Berrenrath in 1986. Nevertheless, these were the only coal conversion projects 
intiated by the social-liberal coalition that ever reached production stage. SAR 
produced a mixture that was suitable as a raw material for the petrochemical 
industry; however, as fuel for households and industry, its prices were hope-
lessly inferior to natural gas in the mid-1980s.50 
In the 1970s, chemical corporation leadership examined whether a return to 
improved coal technology would allow for the substitution of oil. In the end, 
the attempt suffered from the phantom pain of a past technology.51 In the 1979 
business report, Hoechst CEO Rolf Sammet emphasized once more that the 
burning of fossil fuels should be avoided in any case. Both oil and coal should 
be used for higher value products, while nuclear power should be used for 
energy. This strategy was put forward by Hoechst Board member Klaus Weis-
sermel, who demanded a decoupling of raw material and energy.52 In the final 
analysis, and even after the second oil crisis, Hoechst pursued an idea of de-
coupling that had already been developed in the late 1960s. Its realization 
failed for two key reasons. First, the desire of BASF, Hoechst, and other chem-
ical corporations to produce their own nuclear energy was opposed by the 
public, which protested against siting nuclear power plants in metropolitan 
areas. Second, the methods of coal gasification and hydrogenation were mainly 
based on research from the 1930s and 1940s, and a broad-scale, economically 
viable implementation of the technology was hardly possible on account of the 
existing price relationships. As a consequence, and because oil prices dropped 
sharply in the first half of the 1980s, many projects were stopped in the plan-
ning phase. Sammet complained that, in 1979, only seven percent of crude oil 
                                                             
50  The successor company ThyssenKrupp Uhde GmbH has kindly provided some documents on 
coal liquefaction: Uhde, ed., Anlagen für die Kohletechnologie. Texaco-Vergasung (Dort-
mund, 1987); Uhde Jahresbericht 1983, 10-3; Uhde Jahresbericht 1984, 12-3, Uhde Jahres-
bericht 1986, 18-20; BAH, Presseinformation Uhde Nr. 1, Kohle soll Importöl ersetzen. Uhde 
erhält Planungsauftrag für schwedischen Energiekomplex (27.05.1983), Presseinformation 
Uhde Nr. 6, Chemie aus Kohle – Ruhr-Kohle ersetzt importiertes Öl (10.11.1983), Bäumler 
1989, 509-11; Schröter 2000, 393-4; WAUK, Business Report Hoechst 1981, 14; WWA, 
Dortmund, 32, no. 226; Petrochemie auf Kohlebasis, 1984, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
August 8. 
51  Abelshauser 2002, 456. 
52  Weissermel 1980, 144-8; WAUK, Business Report Hoechst 1979, 5, Hoechst heute no. 78, 
Ohne Kernkraft droht das Chaos, 32-7. 
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was converted into chemical products in West Germany, but he did not men-
tion that the majority of Hoechst’s production was consistently based on petro-
chemicals. In 1981, the Hoechst Group consumed about 9.5 billion kilowatt 
hours of electricity, 800,000 tons of heavy and light fuel oil, 400,000 tons of 
coal (including 300,000 tons of coke as raw material), and about one billion 
cubic meters of natural gas (including about 0.1 billion of which as raw materi-
al). Hence, the importance of crude oil as compared to coal had grown since 
1977. Furthermore, it shows the increasing importance of natural gas as a key 
raw material for the company.53 
Both BASF and Hoechst had completed the transition from coal to petro-
chemicals between 1955 to 1965. Even the second oil crisis did not put enough 
price pressure on the chemical industry to render a return of coal chemistry. 
Accordingly, the energy crises caused chemical companies to put more atten-
tion on energy savings and energy recovery. In terms of production, BASF 
radically reduced its capacity to create bulk plastics, which had come under 
significant price pressure due to changes in world market structures, and moved 
towards more profitable specialty plastics.54 The situation at Hoechst was simi-
lar. From 1971 to 1981 its production rose by 43 percent, but, as a result of 
energy recovery systems, there was no increase in steam consumption. Hoechst 
invested more in power-heat coupling and sought a more efficient way to ex-
ploit existing oil reserves. Company management assumed that global oil con-
sumption would hardly be reduced, despite savings and substitution tests. 
Therefore, the company developed corrosion inhibitors for drilling rigs, chemi-
cal additives for drilling muds, and special chemical flooding processes to 
resolve oil from rock.55 In the plastics division, Hoechst faced similar challeng-
es to those of BASF, lowering the production capacity of high-density polyeth-
ylene by about 40 percent in its West German facilities between 1981 and 
1983. Instead, the company focused on producing engineered materials, which 
had been more resistant to the oil crises.56 Even if the German government had 
signficantly subsidized coal conversion, because it wanted to ensure the securi-
ty of the national energy supply and save the coal industry, chemical compa-
nies did not fundamentally shift their supplies of energy and raw materials for 
economic reasons. 
                                                             
53  Bäumler 1989, 491-2; WAUK, Business Report Hoechst 1979, 5, Business Report Hoechst 
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4.  Conclusion 
In the end, both attempts to deal with the energy crises of the 1970s largely 
failed. Although the anticipation of future energy problems led to a diversifica-
tion of energy sources and supplying countries, as well as to energy-saving 
measures, not all of the proposed strategies were successfully implemented. 
Moreover, coal conversion did not fundamentally change the West German 
energy structure; neither did company-owned nuclear power plants become 
reality. Even if the technological options had been available, political concerns 
and a lack of economic viability would have prevented the prevelance of the 
two methods. The problems in the energy and commodities sectors began prior 
to 1973, at least since the Middle East War in 1967 – both West German chem-
ical companies and politicians realized this. The stable purchase situation 
changed, and requests for alternative raw materials and energy options became 
more pressing. Chemical companies had to face the demands of a growing 
environmental movement and cope with the technological change of the “third” 
Industrial Revolution. 
The idea of combining nuclear energy and chemical production was one re-
action to the 1970s’ energy crises. Industrialists like Mandel, Winnacker, and 
Sammet anticipated future energy crises and wanted to implement an entirely 
different energy mix for West Germany. The hope for a new business segment, 
combined with the desire of the largest industrial electricity consumer to reduce 
its dependence on coal and oil, explain the economic interest in nuclear energy. 
BASF’s application to construct its own nuclear power plant promised long-
term energy security. But its rejection of the safety philosophy, which the fed-
eral government could not support for domestic and security policy reasons, 
represented a turning point in nuclear policy. Although the first energy program 
of the social-liberal coalition attributed a higher value to nuclear power, securi-
ty concerns about an NPS in an urban and industrial area prevented approval. 
The decision was less technical and more political, as public skepticism about 
the new technology was growing. This political conflict crossed party lines. A 
permit would have set a precedent for similar applications. With the termina-
tion of its plans in 1976, BASF ended the controversy. In the final analysis, 
economic reasons tipped the balance toward a market solution. Even if chemi-
cal companies had dismissed the idea of an industrial NPS, a large part of the 
country’s electric utilities’ expansion was based on nuclear energy and, as the 
cases of BASF and Hoechst have shown, chemical companies purchased elec-
tricity from these companies. Thus, to a certain extent, the demands for nuclear 
power became a reality, and the makeup of German energy production changed 
fundamentally. Between 1980 and 1985, nuclear power became the most im-
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portant electricity source among West German power supply companies. But 
the chemical companies missed their goal of energy autonomy.57 
The revival of coal conversion was another attempt to prevent future energy 
crises, but economic reasons – namely, the lack of price pressures from coal 
and oil – prevented the technology from being implemented on a large scale. 
The effect of the oil price shock on West Germany’s economy was much less 
than on other industrialized countries as a result of the currency appreciation. 
The political and business initiatives for coal conversion of the 1960s were in 
anticipation of the energy crises that occurred the following decade. From the 
perspective of the German government, securing national energy independence 
with coal made sense, but from a business perspective, companies could only 
go that route if it was economically reasonable – and, for coal gasification and 
liquefaction, this was hardly the case. The German government wanted to solve 
several problems at once. First, it wanted to end the long-running mining crisis. 
Second, it wanted to maintain the chemical industry’s competitiveness by re-
ducing its dependence on price fluctuations within the international commodity 
markets. Third, the government aimed to stop or, at least, slow down the in-
creasing expenses in its balance of payments, and it initiated extensive subsidy 
programs following the planning euphoria of the boom period. New methods in 
coal conversion would support the exportation of technical knowledge and 
machinery, preserving the strength of the West German export economy. The 
two oil crises pushed the development of coal conversion. Chemical companies 
were willing to participate in such research, but only if the state took on the 
entrepreneurial risk and subsidized the investments.  
However, almost none of these proceedings reached production stage. The 
industrial plants that went into operation in the mid-1980s only supplemented 
the existing German energy structure. The chemical industry wielded enormous 
influence on political decisions and purported to be innovative. In fact, it was 
only willing to do so with government support. German chemical companies 
adapted themselves to the higher oil prices – an expensive shift back to coal 
made no economic sense, and neither did the lack of large-scale systems during 
the 1970s make coal conversion an adequate short-term response to the actual 
crisis. Instead, chemical companies shifted their production of mass and stand-
ard products to higher-value goods and initiated extensive rationalization and 
energy efficiency programs. As such, coal regained importance within the West 
German chemical industry in the 1980s – after its decline in the late 1960s – 
while oil consumption could be significantly reduced. Modern systems for 
industrial heat and power generation, in particular, were responsible for these 
energy savings. Some companies relied more heavily on gas, but the chemical 
                                                             
57  For the production of electricity of West German power supply companies, see Statistisches 
Bundesamt, ed., 1965-1990, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Stutt-
gart and Mainz: Kohlhammer. 
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industry’s natural gas consumption stabilized after the economic crisis of 
1974/75; in contrast, West German imports of natural gas have increased stead-
ily since the late 1960s, which changed the national energy structure. Further-
more, the chemical industry succeeded in stopping the increase in its electricity 
needs – despite the chemical boom after the second oil crisis, their electricity 
consumption in the late 1980s was at 1974 levels. Therefore, West German 
chemical companies stayed competitive, even if electricity was not produced 
by their own nuclear power plants, but from those of power companies. Mar-
ket-based solutions prevailed in the end.58  
All in all, the energy crises left their mark. Both coping strategies point to a 
political-economic context and are characteristic of discussions about the in-
dustrialized world’s energy configuration. In the two cases presented, the state 
acted as a central player, without which neither the termination of BASF’s 
project nor the coal research of the 1970s could be explained. Despite cross-
border trade, international capital flows, and the spread of multinational com-
panies, the nation-state remained an indispensible actor in energy security. In 
an international context, coal liquefaction was implemented only in South 
Africa to avoid trade barriers, but the technology did not change global energy 
production. On the contrary, even though corporate-owned nuclear power 
stations were not approved in West Germany, nuclear energy became an im-
portant ingredient in energy generation on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and it 
led to the present-day controversies around Germany’s energy transition. 
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